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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Appeal
Declaratory

is

from

Judgment

Plaintiffs.

The

jurisdiction

the Court's Memorandum

granting

Supreme

Summary

Court

of

Decision

Judgment

the

State

to hear this Appeal under Utah

of

and

for

the

Utah

has

Code Ann.

§78-2-

2(3)(i) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)e(iii).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Director of State Lands upheld an audit and demand for
payment issued by the Division of State Lands.

The Plaintiffs

filed a Declaratory Judgment action challenging the Director's
The trial court granted Plaintiffs7 Motion for Summary

decision.
Judgment

and

entered

a

Declaratory

Judgment

reversing

the

decision of the Director.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows:
(1)

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

entering

Summary

Judgment authorizing depletion of the trust asset for less than
full

value

in

view

of

Federal

and

State

constitutional

law

governing school trust lands?
(2)

Whether

the

plain

language

of

the

lease

may

be

rewritten by the court because one party claims it is ambiguous?
(3)

Whether

Plaintiffs

should

be

barred

from

using

doctrine of estoppel to avoid paying monies owed to the school
trust fund when it was Plaintiffs7 duty to report and pay the
1

the

correct amount of royalties?
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Enabling Act, §6:
That upon the admission of said State into the Union,
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirtysix in every township of said proposed state, and where
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in
legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said
State for the support of common schools.••.
Utah Enabling Act §10:
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for
educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise
provided, shall constitute a permanent school fund, the
interest of which only shall be expended for the
support of said schools, and such land shall not be
subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other
entry under the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for
school purposes only.
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5:
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July
16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be
safely invested and held by the State; and the income
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges,
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and
conditions of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was
amended, effective July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming
Sections 5 and 7 ) .
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1:
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are
2

hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people,
to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the
respective purposes for which they have been or may be
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental,
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it
may deem necessary in the interest of the state.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76:
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by
the State Land Board shall before execution by such
board be approved as to form by the attorney general.
30 U.S.C. §207(a):
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less
than 12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined
by regulation, except the Secretary may determine a
lesser amount in the case of coal recovered by
underground mining operations....
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2:
2.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 12 1/2% of the value of the coal removed from
a surface mine.
3.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 8% of the value of the coal removed from an
underground mine, except that the (Minerals Management
Service) may determine a lesser amount, but in no case
less than 5% if conditions warrant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Division of State Lands audited the payments under
its coal leases on school trust lands.

One of those leases was

held by Plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company.
3

Demand was made to

Plaintiffs to pay royalties found by the audit to have been
underpaid.

Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the auditors to

the Director of the Division of State Lands.

The Director, after

a hearing, upheld the audit and the demand for payment. (R.43 6)
Plaintiffs

then

filed

this

action

in

the

Seventh

Judicial

District Court, asking for a declaration that the State could not
collect the unpaid royalties.
Summary Judgment.

Both parties filed Motions for

The trial court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for

Summary Judgment finding that Plaintiffs owed nothing to the
State.

(Addenda 1 and 2)

It is from those Orders that this

appeal is taken.
The

United

States, pursuant

to the Utah

Enabling Act,

granted lands to the State of Utah to be used for the support of
the common schools.
trustee.

The State of Utah holds that land as

Management of those lands is by the Board of State

Lands and the Division of State Lands. Utah Code Ann. §65-1-14.
On March

15, 1965 the State

issued

to Mountain States

Machinery and Supply, Inc., coal lease no. 22729. (Addendum 3)
The lease authorizes extraction of coal from school trust lands
located in Carbon County, Utah.

The lease is perpetual, as long

as coal is produced in commercial quantities, with a provision
for adjustment at the end of each 2 0-year period.

The lease was

assigned to the Plaintiffs.
The United States Government owns most of the coal-producing
lands within the State of Utah.
4

Therefore, the royalty charged

on federal coal leases generally becomes the prevailing market
royalty rate for coal leases within the State.

When State lease

no. 22729 was issued by the State, the royalty rate on many
federal coal leases was $.15 per ton.

The paragraph (Article III

Second) requiring the payment of royalty on the subject State
lease requires Lessees:
To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day
of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of $.15 per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases
issued by the United State at that time,
whichever is higher....
State

lease

no.

22729

also

requires

the

Plaintiffs to

prepare and forward to the State, each quarter, a certified
statement as to the amount of production together with other
information as required by the State Land Board.
Third)

(Article III,

The State also retained the right to go upon the premises

and conduct audits of the lessees' records. (Article XI)
The federal coal lease royalty rate generally remained at
$.15 per ton until August 4, 1976.

On August 4, 1976 the Federal

Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 30 U.S.C. §§201-209 was
enacted by Congress.

The Act and the regulations promulgated

thereunder, increased the royalty rate on surface mines to 12
1/2% of the value of the coal produced and the royalty rate on
5

underground mines to 8% of the value of the coal produced.
Between January 1, 1979 and the audit, twenty-four

(24) coal

leases were issued by the United States Bureau of Land Management
on lands within the State of Utah. (R.466)

Nineteen (19) of

those leases required a royalty payment of 8% of the value of
coal. (R.466)

Only one required a royalty rate of less than 8%

and that royalty rate was 5% of the value of the coal.

The

adjoining States of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico have all
increased their royalty rate to at least 8% of gross sales value
of the coal extracted. (R.475, 478 and 481)

On April 1, 1980,

the Plaintiffs entered into a federal coal lease U37045 on land
in the State of Utah which provided for a royalty rate of 8% of
the value of the coal removed. (R.466-68)
The lands that the Division of State Lands manages have
thousands of mineral leases.

The Division does not have the

funds or the personnel to monitor each lease, or the payments
received on those leases. (R.436)

Instead the State of Utah, as

written in its lease provisions and regulations, requires its
lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the correct
amounts of royalties. (Addendum 3)

Like reporting taxes, it has

largely been an honor reporting system.

In 1981 the Utah State

Legislature appropriated funds for the Division of State Lands to
hire an auditor to review income from its mineral leases. (R.436)
Richard Mitchell was hired.

(R.471)

He set up an auditing

procedure and started to audit the State's oil and gas leases.
6

(R.471)

In 1984 the Auditing Division was expanded and two

auditors, Douglas E. Johnson and Ralph Aiello were hired. (R.450,
457)
In December of 1984 the auditors started to review the State
coal leases.
of

Land

Management

examination
records.

The audit included an analysis of the U.S. Bureau

of

the

records

on

federal

Plaintiffs' and

The auditors

coal

other

leases

State

coal

and

an

lessee

found that the coal lessees had, in

certain instances, under reported production and failed to report
other vital information.

They also found that the royalty rate

on federal coal leases had increased to 8% beginning in 1977, but
the Plaintiffs had failed to report and pay royalties at the
prevailing federal rate. (R.450, 457)
An audit report was prepared and submitted to the Division
of State Lands. (R.457)

The Director of the Division of State

Lands established an audit committee to review the auditors7
report.

The audit committee reviewed the lease and the findings

of the auditors' report.

Some adjustments were made to the audit

report and it was approved. (R.43 6, 457)

The audit report was

then sent to the Plaintiffs with a request for payment of the
delinquent royalties together with interest.
The Plaintiffs, upon receipt of the audit report, requested
a hearing before the Director of the Division of State Lands. A
hearing was held.

The Director rejected the appeal and upheld

the findings of the auditors. (R.43 6)
7

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Summary Judgment is appropriate only when the

pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).

This Court

should consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Defendants, Durham vs. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 at 1334 (Utah
1977), and affirm the decision only if the Court determines there
is no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact and that
the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Briggs vs. Holcombe, 740 P.2d 281 at 283

(Utah 1987).

This

Court, in reviewing the issues of law, gives no deference to the
trial court.

Atlas Corporation vs. Clovis National Bank, 737

P.2d 225 at 229 (Utah 1987).
The

issues

before

the

Court have been

Plaintiffs by the Director of State Lands.

decided

against

The Court, when

reviewing the decision of the Director, should not override the
Director's interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and
regulations unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous.

This

Court should only inquire as to whether the Director acted in
excess of his powers in upholding the audit.

McKnight vs. State

Land Board, 381 P.2d 726 at 731 (Utah 1963), Atlantic Richfield
Company vs. Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587 at 591 (10th Cir. 1970).
8

The Defendants agree that the controlling issues in the case
are issues of law.

The Defendants maintain that when the issues

of law are correctly decided they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

Defendants maintain, however, that there are

issues

in

of

fact

dispute

judgment for the Plaintiffs.

which

preclude

entry

of

summary

Defendants request that this Court

review the legal issues, that those issues be decided in favor of
Defendants, and that the case be remanded with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The

State

of

Utah,

as

a

condition

of

statehood,

acquired certain lands in trust for the benefit of the common
schools.

The State has a Constitutional and moral duty to obtain

full value from the disposition of those lands.

The trial court

placed impermissible restrictions on the trust lands in question
when it restricted the royalty rate the State could collect from
those lands to $.15 per ton rather than allowing the State to
collect the contractually-required market rate of 8% of value of
the coal.
2.

The royalty provision in the coal lease is clear and

should be given its plain meaning.

The requirement that the

Plaintiffs periodically determine whether the federal royalty
rate has changed and that they pay royalties on the changed rate
does not create an ambiguity.

Such provisions are common in

long-term leases to insure that the parties pay according to
9

prevailing market terms•

In this case, a fluctuating royalty

rate is constitutionally required to insure that the trust fund
receives full value for its lands.
3.

The Court should use rules of construction to clarify

any ambiguity

in the lease.

The trial court erred when it

rewrote the parties7 lease by limiting royalties to $.15 per ton.
Not even the Plaintiffs claim that the royalty rate should always
remain at $.15 per ton.

The lease should be construed to give

meaning to all its provisions including subparagraph (b) of the
royalty provision which provides for increases in the royalty
rate.
4.

Estoppel should not be used by the Court to prevent the

trust fund from receiving full value for its assets.
Enabling

Act

requires

the

trust

to

receive

The Utah

full value and

requires the State to manage the trust fund in its governmental
capacity.

To allow estoppel in this case would violate those

constitutional requirements and would cost the trust fund in
excess of three million dollars.
5.

The Plaintiffs have suffered no injury, were aware of

the facts which caused the royalty rate to increase, and had the
duty to pay the correct royalties.

The State is only asking that

the Plaintiffs pay what is required by the lease.
should not be estopped.

10

Such a request

ARGUMENT
POINT I. UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THE TRUST ASSETS OF THE STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS MAY
NOT BE DEPLETED FOR LESS THAN FULL VALUE.
The State lands which are subject to the coal lease in
question are school trust lands.

The interpretation of the lease

and the other issues that were before the trial court were
subject to rules of law established by the Utah Enabling Act,
Constitutional

provisions

and

case

law.

The

trial

court

erroneously rejected the law governing school trust lands in its
construction of the lease and in its holding that the State was
estopped from obtaining fair market value for its trust lands.
This argument will first set forth a brief historical background
on the purpose and policy of trust lands and will then examine
the

case

law which

the

trial

court should

have applied in

deciding this case.
A.
The Historical
Perspective.

Background

Provides

Essential

Utah is one of thirty (30) public land states whose Enabling
Act granted lands to be used for the support of schools and
institutions.
1981].

L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed.

In Utah vs. Kleepe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978) rev'd

on other grounds 446 U.S. 500 (1980) the Court explained the
purpose of the school land grants:
There were no federal lands within the borders of the
original thirteen states when they adopted and ratified
the United States Constitution. Thus, virtually all of
the lands within their borders were subject to
taxation, including taxation necessary for the
11

maintenance of their public school systems. When other
states were subsequently admitted into the Union, their
territorial confines were "carved" from federal
territories. The "public lands" owned and reserved by
the United States within those territorial confines
were not subject to taxation. This reservation by the
United States created serious impediment to the "public
land" states in relation to an adequate property tax
base necessary to permit these states to operate and
maintain essential government services, including the
public school systems. It was in recognition thereof,
i.e., in order to "equalize" the status of the newly
admitted states with that of the original thirteen
states, that the Congress enacted the federal land
grant statutes. The specific purpose was to create a
binding permanent trust which would generate financial
aid to support the public school systems of the "public
land" states.
Id. at 758.
The Utah Enabling Act granted four (4) sections of land in
each township
Enabling

Act

for the
§6.

The

support of the common schools.
State

of Utah, in

Utah

its Constitution,

accepted those lands in trust for the respective purposes for
which they had been granted.

Constitution of Utah, Article XX.

B.
The Law Requires The Receipt Of Full Value From
The Disposition Of Trust Lands.
The school land grants constitute a solemn agreement between
the United States and the State of Utah.

There has been imposed

upon the State of Utah:
[a] binding and perpetual obligation to use the granted
lands for the support of public education. All revenue
from the sale or lease of the school grants was
impressed with a trust in favor of the public schools.
No State could divert school lands to other public
purposes without compensating the trust for the full
market value of the interest taken.
Andrus vs. Utah, 446 U.S. 500 at 523-524, 64 L.Ed.2d 458 at 474,
12

100 Sup. Ct. 1803 (1981).
Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University
vs. State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268 at 274 (1852) the Supreme Court
of the United States has consistently held that a State holds
school lands in trust for the benefit of its schools.

Congress

and the Courts have placed restrictions on the use of the trust
lands so that they are not exploited for private advantage or
depleted by State action or inaction.

Lassen vs. Arizona, 385

U.S. 458, 87 S.Ct. 584, 17 L.Ed.2d 515 at 522 (1967).

(While

Lassen dealt with surface rights, recent cases make it clear that
these restrictions also apply to mineral interests located on
school trust lands.

Jensen vs. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32 at 35 (Utah

1982), Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295,
96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 1 at 8 (1976).)
The duty of the State, in managing mineral rights on trust
lands, is to obtain full value for the trust assets:
The royalty rate set by the state is important because
it represents payment for a trust asset which will be
gone forever once the mineral is removed from the
ground.
Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling
Act and the trust concept are the most important
factors to consider in determining an optimum royalty
rate.
If the rate is too low the state will be
committing a breach of trust by diminishing the trust.
Royalty payments are placed in a permanent trust fund,
the corpus of which is invested; the trust is kept
whole if fair market value is received. If the royalty
rate is too low the trust will not be kept whole.
3 State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates.
Land Law Review, 119, 130 (1982).

See also Kadish vs. Arizona

State Land Department, 747 P.2d 1183 at 1195 (Ariz. 1987).
13

Public

State

vs. Kleepe, supra at 758; State vs. University of Alaska, 624
P.2d 807 at 813 (Alaska 1981).
To enforce this important trust purpose, the Courts have
consistently

rejected

any

State

statutes,

constitutional

provisions and Court-imposed doctrines which restrict the State
from obtaining full value from the trust lands.
Arizona

State

Land

Department,

supra, the

In Kadish vs.

Supreme

Court of

Arizona held unconstitutional an Arizona statute that fixed a
flat royalty rate for mineral leases on state school trust lands.
The court noted that federal law is supreme in this field and
that:
[n]either this court, nor the legislature, nor the
people may alter or amend the trust provisions
contained in the Enabling Act without congressional
approval.
Id. at p. 1185.

The court said that the Enabling Act intended to

severely circumscribe the power of state government to deal with
the assets of the common school fund.

It analyzed the court

cases dealing with this subject and pointed out that:
[t]he courts have consistently construed the scope of
federal land grants in favor of the government.
In
dealing with trust land ... all doubts must be resolved
in favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes.
Id. at p.1195.
The primary case discussing the Utah Enabling Act is State
of Utah vs. Kleepe, supra.

That case dealt with the State's "in

lieu" selections of additional lands to replace lands the State
had not received pursuant to the Enabling Act.
14
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reviewing the Utah Enabling Act and the historical development ~_
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;.. S J U I lands or lands can be made that
confl
-, L^ur with th^ terms and purposes of the
grant in the Enabling
; or the provisicns o: th~
Constitution relating L. such land and funds.
The
State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage
the trust estate for t;*e exclusive benefit of the
beneficiaries, and returi: full value from the use ar.d
. disposition of the trust property.
Id. at p.235.
In County of_ Skamania v s . Washing ton r 685 P, 2d 576 a t: 582
(Wash, 1984) a state statute which all owed purchasers of timber
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from trust lands to default so as to avoid insolvency on the part
of timber purchases was held unconstitutional.
In Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295
at 3 05

(1976),

the federal government condemned school trust

lands including sections leased as grazing lands.

Commenting on

the validity of a school trust leasehold made for less than fair
value, the court considered a protective provision contained in
the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act which provided against the
initial selling of lease rentals at less than fair value.

The

United States Supreme Court held that if the lease of trust lands
was for a rental of substantially less than the land's then fair
value, the lease was void.
The Courts consistently hold that entities, such as the
Plaintiffs, are charged with knowledge of the trust and are also
subject to the duty to obtain full value for the trust.

State

vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 at 1199 (Ok. 1953),
State vs. Lamacus, 263 P.2d 426 at 427 (Ok. 1953), Seidel vs.
Seward, 133 NW.2d 390 at 391 (Neb. 1965), State vs. Board of
Educational Lands and Funds of Nebraska, 65 NW.2d 392 at 397
(Neb. 1954) and Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702 P.2d
948 at 957 (Mont. 1985).
C.
Trust Land Law And Policy Should Be Applied To The
Facts Of This Case.
The State of Utah has the duty to receive full market value
from the disposition of its school trust lands.

The market

royalty rate on coal leases, in the State of Utah, is controlled
16
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lease to limit royalties to $.15 per ton imposed constitutionally
impermissible restrictions on the trust fund.

That decision, in

this case, costs the trust fund, as of the audit, three million
dollars with an ongoing loss of more than $2.00 per ton for coal
produced after the audit.

The contract created by the trial

court runs directly counter to the law and public policy of this
State.

Thus, the court below is in the anomalous position of

having written a contract which violates "the generally accepted
doctrine of this country that every contract in violation of law
is void."
(1922).

Baker vs. Latses, 60 Utah 38, 44, 206 P.2d 533 at 555
See also. Haddock vs. Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 52, 65 P.

491 (1901) (holding void as against public policy a contract to
pay fees for service of legal processes where the fees set in the
contract were different from the fees set by statute); BoisePayette Lumber Company vs. Challis Independent School District,
No. 1 of Custer County, 46 Idaho 403 at 26 (1928) (holding that
judicial determinations of public policy must recognize and yield
to any applicable legislative enactments).
The instant case should be reversed and remanded to the
trial

court

with

instructions

that

the

escalator

clause be

enforced and that the trust fund receive royalty rates at the
prevailing market rate of 8% of the value of the coal removed
together with interest as provided by the regulations.
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clauses require the parties to ascertain a fluctuating rate from
facts outside the body of the lease.

See e.g. Energy Reserves

Group, Inc., vs. Kansas Power and Light Company, 459 U.S. 400 at
417

(1983) , Amoco

Production

Company

vs.

Stauffer

Chemical

Company of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 at 468 (Wyo. 1980), Lonestar Gas
Company vs. The Howard Corporation, 556 S.W.2d 372 at 376 (Tx.
1977) .
effect

The ascertaining of facts outside the lease, to put into
the

lease

provisions, does not

create

an ambiguity.

Instead, such provisions are drafted to insure that rates, such
as

royalty

rates,

are

tied

to

the

market

price,

thereby

protecting both parties during the term of the lease.
The royalty provision contained in the contract provides a
formula for fixing the payment price.

Subsection

(b) of the

provision states that the royalty payment to be paid by the
Plaintiffs is determined by the prevailing federal rate on lands
of similar character under coal leases issued by the federal
government.

Plaintiffs have the duty to determine any change in

the federal royalty rate.

The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments

Act of 1976 increased the royalty rate to 8% of the value of the
coal produced on federal coal leases.

The federal government

owns the majority of coal reserves in Utah.

Since 1979, 19 of 24

coal leases issued by the federal government in the State require
a royalty payment of 8% of value.

In addition, the adjoining

states of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico have increased the
royalty rate to at least 8% of the value of coal produced under
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POINT III. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THE LAW
REGARDING TRUST LANDS, THE ESCALATOR PROVISIONS OF THE
LEASE, AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES AND IMPOSED A FLAT
$.15 PER TON ROYALTY RATE.
A.
Any Ambiguous Provision Should Be Resolved By
Rules Of Construction Instead Of Being Deleted From The
Lease.
If the Court determines there is an ambiguity in the lease
then the Court should apply certain rules of construction to
interpret or clarify the ambiguous provision.
not delete or rewrite the contract.
are:

(1) the

intent

The Court should

Those rules of construction

of the parties when

entering

into the

contract controls the meaning of the contract, Utah Valley Bank
vs. Tanner, supra at 1061; (2) existing law which affects the
provision is considered part of the contract and governs its
construction, Robinson vs. Joint School District, 596 P.2d 436 at
438

(Ida. 1979),

Farmers

Investment Company

vs. Pima Mining

Company, 523 P.2d 487 at 489 (Az. 1974); (3) consideration should
be given

to the

contract

and

the

subject matter, nature and purpose of the
motives

of

the

parties,

Nagle

vs.

Club

Fontainbleu, 405 P.2d 346 at 348 (Utah 1965); (4) the contract
should be viewed from the perspective of the parties at the time
it was signed, DeBouis vs. Nigh, 584 P.2d 823 at 824 (Utah 1978);
(5) the court should give the entire contract meaning and not
ignore any of the provisions of the contract or rewrite the
contract; Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d
743 at 749 (Utah 1982) and (6) the contract must be construed
liberally to protect the public interest, Public Service Company
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increased to 8%.

The undisputed facts show that from 1979 to the

present all newly issued federal leases in Utah, except for one,
were at the rate of 8% or greater.

The Director of State Lands

properly construed the lease to require payment of royalties at
8%.
B.
The Plaintiffs Have Never Contended That
Royalty Should Always Remain At $.15 Per Ton.
One

of

the

things

that

is

certain

about

the

The
royalty

provision, in addition to the plain meaning of Subsection b, is
that the contracting parties intended that the royalty rate would
change if federal royalty rates increased.

The Plaintiffs argue

that the Court should look at past practices of the parties to
determine

the

meaning

of

the

royalty

provision.

The past

practices of the parties are of no benefit at all in construing
the meaning of the paragraphs involved in this case.

The past

practice of the parties, of paying the rate specified under
Subparagraph a, has nothing to do with Subparagraph b which
surely must also be given effect.

The contract must be construed

to give effect to both provisions.

Hal Taylor Associates vs.

Union America, Inc., supra at 749.

The obvious problem with

Plaintiffs7 claim for interpretation of the royalty provision is
that it ignores Subparagraph b.

That is not interpretation, that

is selective blindness.
The Plaintiffs do not argue that $.15 is the prevailing
federal rate for federal leases on land of similar character
under coal leases issued by the United States during the time
24
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Except as otherwise provided by ] aw, the State Land
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royalty shall be computed, and such other detai Is as it
25

may deem necessary in the interest of the state.
The

trial

court

should

rewrite the parties' lease.

not be

allowed

to

unilaterally

If there is an ambiguity, the trial

court should be directed to apply proper rules of construction to
clarify the ambiguity and give meaning to all of the royalty
provisions.
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circumstances;

and (c) the undisputed facts will not support a

finding of estoppel.
A.
The Important Policy Of Receiving Full Value For
The Trust Fund Prohibits The Use Of Estoppel.
The trial court erred when it concluded that Defendants were
estopped, as a matter of law, from enforcing the terms of the
lease and obtaining full value for the trust fund.

Courts which

have considered whether estoppel should be applied when it would
reduce the income to school trust lands have consistently held
that the important public policy of providing full value to the
trust

lands

prohibits

the

imposition

of

a defense

such as

estoppel.
In State vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok.
1953) the clerk for the State failed to reserve minerals when
issuing

a certificate

allowing

reformation

rights

of purchase for land.
of

the documents

to the State, held

that the

The Court, in

restoring
State was

the mineral
acting

in a

governmental capacity and that it would be a violation of the
State's

trust

responsibilities

mineral rights.

to

allow

divestiture

of

the

Furthermore, the court said that the purchaser

is charged with notice that the State is acting as a trustee and
is

charged

with

notice

that

the

State

could

only

act

in

compliance with rules and regulations of its position as trustee.
The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to
those acts which were beyond the authority of the State employee
when he issued the deed and failed to reserve the mineral rights.
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Id, at 1199.

The State employee in this case had no authority,

either intentionally or accidentally, to set a royalty rate lower
than the prevailing federal rate.
In State vs. Northwest Maanesite Company,

182 P.2d

643

(Wash. 1947) the Commissioner of public lands promised the lessee
of school trust lands that the lessee could remit royalties on
the basis of net profits.

That representation was contrary to

the statute and the lease.

The Court, in holding that the lessee

was required to pay royalties in accordance with the terms of the
lease, held that the State was acting in a governmental capacity,
that estoppel could not be used to enforce the promise of the
Commissioner of Public Lands, that Defendant's payment of money
did not constitute an estoppel, and that the State was entitled
to interest on the unpaid royalties.

Id. at 662.

In the case of Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702
P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985), Defendants claimed that they were entitled
to

certain water

rights.

The Montana

Supreme Court denied

Defendants' claim and found that the water rights were part of
of the school trust lands of the State of Montana.

The Court

held that there were three important principals governing school
trust lands.

Those principals were: (1) the Enabling Act created

a trust which the State could not violate; (2) the Enabling Act
was to be strictly construed according to fiduciary principles;
and (3) the Enabling Act pre-empted State laws and constitutions.
It further held that Courts are to be very protective of the
29

trust and emphatic of the need to preserve the value of the trust
corpus.

The Court also found that an interest in State land

cannot be conveyed without adequate compensation and that any use
or management which would devalue State lands is impermissible.
It said that anyone who acquires an interest in trust lands does
so subject to the trust and that trust lands are subject to a
different set of rules than other public lands.

Id. at 956.

The holdings in the above cases are consistent with the
manner in which this Court has decided issues involving estoppel
against the State.

The general rule in Utah is that an estoppel

cannot be applied against the State if to do so would violate
State statute.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company,

supra at 719.

In the case at hand, the application of an

estoppel would be a violation of both State statutes and the
Constitution of Utah.

Even if the Court determines that estoppel

could apply, the Plaintiffs must prove that estoppel is necessary
to prevent manifest injustice and the public interest would not
be unduly damaged by imposing the defense. Utah State University
vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 715 at 718 (Utah 1982), Celebrity
Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 at
694 (Utah 1979).

In Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company

the Court stated:
[t]he rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel
against the government is sound and generally should be
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as
hereinabove stated, where the interest of justice
mandates an exception to the general rule. In cases
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is
30

whether it appears that the facts may be found with
sufficient certainty, and the injustice to be suffered
is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.
Id., p.720.
The essential policy and public interest in trust land cases
is the requirement that the trust fund receive full value for its
assets.

To allow the application of estoppel in this case would

defeat that purpose.

As pointed out in Utah State University vs.

Sutro and Company and Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor
Control Commission the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied
when it would violate such an important public purpose.

See

also, Western Kane County Service District vs. Jackson Cattle
Company, 744 P.2d 1376 at 1378 (Utah 1987) (reversing a ruling
based on estoppel and stating "[w]e are extremely reluctant to
apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in
a public highway by a governmental entity").
In addition, there is no manifest injustice involved.

An

assertion of manifest injustice requires the Plaintiffs to prove
with certainty that paying royalties at $.15 per ton is a higher
purpose than that of the trust fund receiving full value for its
assets.
718.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, supra at

The injustice in this case is the trial court's application

of estoppel giving the Plaintiffs a windfall at the expense of
the school trust fund.
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B.
Estoppel Is Applicable Only In Very
Circumstances When The State Is Acting
Governmental Capacity,

Limited
In Its

The question of whether the State of Utah acted in its
governmental or proprietary capacity when managing school trust
lands was considered by the Utah Supreme Court in Duchesne County
vs. State Tax Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943) • This Court
held:
Here the trusteeship of the fund was vested in the
State by the Enabling Act as a condition of statehood,
as a condition to the right of the State to be born,
and imposed upon the State at its birth by the
instrument of its creation as a condition of its life
as a government.
It must therefore be held by the
state in a governmental capacity.
Id., p.343.
This ruling is in line with rulings in other states which
have considered the issue as well as the present case law of the
State

of

Utah

regarding

the distinction

functions, and governmental
retains its immunity.

between

proprietary

functions as to which the State

A governmental function has been defined

as a function which is performed only by a government entity and
is essential to the core of governmental activity.

Cox vs. Utah

Land and Mortgage Corporation, 716 P.2d 783 at 785 (Utah 1986),
Metropolitan Financial Company vs. State, 714 P.2d 293 at 294
(Utah 1986).
definition

The Utah Legislature has recently expanded that
to

include

governmental activities.

non-essential

as

well

as

essential

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a).

The

management of school trust lands is an obligation imposed upon
32

the

State

by

Constitution.

a

federal

statute

and

accepted

by

the

Utah

It is an activity that can only be performed by

the State.
As

already

established,

the

Court

must

be

extremely

reluctant to apply estoppel when the State is acting in its
governmental capacity.

When public lands are involved, still

more restrictive rules govern.

For example, adverse possession

cannot be applied against public lands.
P.2d 697 at 698 (Utah 1934).

Peterson vs. Johnson, 34

Great protection is given to trust

lands because doctrines such as estoppel or adverse possession
defeat constitutional requirements to receive full value for the
trust and violate the State's governmental powers.

Department of

State Lands vs. Pettibone, supra at 952.
It is hard to imagine any other act of the State which would
be more governmental in nature than the trust responsibilities
imposed by the Enabling Act and accepted by the State in its
Constitution and as a requirement to obtain statehood.

Estoppel

cannot be used to prevent the State from functioning in this
important government capacity.
C.
The Undisputed Facts Do Not Support A Finding Of
Estoppel.
The trial court erred when it concluded that the State was
estopped

from

collecting

delinquent

royalty

payments.

Its

finding that the Plaintiffs had relied on the State's lack of
protest, and had mined the coal in reliance upon a royalty rate
of $.15 per ton was wrong.

The facts upon which reliance and
33

detriment

could

Defendants.

correctly

be

founded

were

disputed

by

the

Indeed, the undisputed facts showed that it was the

State that relied on the Plaintiffs to pay the correct royalty
amount.

The Plaintiffs had the duty to the State to calculate

and pay the correct royalty.

The State did not have a duty to

Plaintiffs to collect the correct royalty although it has such a
duty to the school trust.
If the doctrine of estoppel were applicable in this case the
Plaintiffs must prove: (1) a false representation or concealment
of a material fact; (2) made with knowledge of the facts; (3)
made to a party without knowledge or the means of knowledge of
the

real

facts;

(4)

made

with

the

intention

that

the

representation be acted upon; and (5) the parties to whom the
representation was made, relied or acted upon is injured.

Colman

vs. Colman. 743 P.2d 782 at 790 (Utah 1987).
One is not entitled to rely on erroneous or unauthorized
statements of a government employee.

Dansie vs. Murray City, 560

P.2d 1123 at 1124 (Utah 1977), Atlantic Richfield vs. Hickel,
supra at 591.

If a person has the means to determine the actual

facts estoppel does not apply.
supra.

Morgan vs. Board of State Lands,

To claim estoppel against the government, the injury must

be substantial.

Paying what is owed under the lease is not an

injury.

Barnes vs. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1988); Williams vs.

PSC,

P.2d

, 77 U.A.R. 11 (Utah 1988); and Utah Department

of Transportation vs. Reagan.

P.2d
34

, 78 U.A.R. 23 (Utah

Ct. App. 1988) .
The undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel.
It was the Plaintiffs who were responsible to correctly report
the royalty rate and payments.

It was the Plaintiffs who had

substantial dealings with the federal government and who were
aware of the increase in the federal royalty rate (R.398) and it
was the State that relied on the Plaintiffs to accurately report
and accurately pay the correct royalty amount.
undisputed

facts

support

a

finding

of

(R.436)

estoppel

The

against the

Plaintiffs and not in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs claim that there were certain representations
made by unidentified Division employees that the lease was in
good standing and that the State failed to notify Plaintiffs of
the higher royalty rate.

Any representations regarding good

standing had no application to the amount of royalty to be paid.
On the matter in issue the State was silent.

Silence by the

State will not support estoppel, especially when the State did
not know the facts but was relying on the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs

also claim they would have not have mined the State coal lease if
the royalty rate had been increased and allege that they will
incur a loss if required to pay the increased royalty rate.
Defendants disputed those allegations by attaching Exhibits 7
through 10 to its Motion for Summary Judgment showing the profit
made by the Plaintiffs. (R.416-426)

Also during the time period

in question, Plaintiffs were entering into leases with the
35

Federal Government for lands in the same mine plan and were
paying 8% royalties on those leases. (R.398)
only be required to pay what the lease requires.
constitute injury.
supra,

Plaintiffs will
Such does not

Barnes vs. Wood, supra, Williams vs. PSC,

If this Court determines that the doctrine of estoppel

could apply in this case, then the matter should be remanded to
the trial court for trial with Plaintiffs having the burden to
prove they have met the elements required for estoppel.
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CONCLUSION
The law requires that the State of Utah receive a maximum
return on its disposition of school trust lands.

The State

implemented that requirement by linking the royalty rate on the
lease to the prevailing federal royalty rate.

The decision of

the trial court imposes improper restrictions on the trust lands.
The State asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial
court and remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of the State of Utah upholding the decision of the Director
of State Lands.
Respectfully submitted this /*/day of June, 1988.
NIELSEN & SjE^IOR
Attorneys/^dr Appellant

ClarK'B. Allred ~
By: A\jvxxfto^\\\tU&ftdfc^^
Gayle ^ . McKeachnie
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM 1

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a
]
Delaware Corporation, and
]
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT
]1
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

;

THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,

]
i

Civil No. 14890

Defendants.
The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from
the court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should
be construed in light of the parties course of performance;
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legal
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped

from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally
enforced.
The defendants have objected to the granting of the
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period;
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the
3oard of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff,
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board.
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on
the Motions as hereinafter stated.
-2-

Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part,
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of
those undisputed facts.

There is no dispute as to the fact

that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15,
1965, and that the Lease provides as follows:
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter,
royalty
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher. . . •"
That the lease was on a standard form provided by
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 150
per ton.

The payment was received and retained by the State

without question or objection throughout the audit period and
prior thereto from sometime in 1965.

The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has
two columns.

One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed

Percentage Basis.

Plateau and their predecessors in interest

filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15C per ton and
left the other column blank.
After the term of the lease had expired, December
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook,
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments.

The

audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of
1985.
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed.

Based upon

the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales
Value of coal removed.
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of
-4-

the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of
the lease is ambiguous.
The royalty provision is divided into two parts.
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive
determination and provides for 15^ per ton on coal produced
from the leased premises.
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several
factors not immediately capable of definitive determination.
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and
provided as from what is stated.

In other words, at the

beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is
it prevalent?

Who makes the determination that the land in the

State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in
character and what is the basis for determining similarity?
What time period is used to determine federal leases "issued...
at that time" and who makes that determination?

Even if a

prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the
"value of the coal removed11 as stated in the federal regulation
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in
his assessment, and who makes that determination?
-5-

For these reasons, the Court has concluded that
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal
obligation on the lessee since the identifiable factors
necessary for self-execution could not independently be
ascertained by either party.
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it would require
some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a
retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of
sub-paragraph (a) without objection or comment.
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty
under sub-paragraph (a).
Since the State by an established course of conduct
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that
provided for 15c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting a
different construction of the Lease where they took no
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted
construction to an ambiguous lease provision.
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further
-6-

ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will
be, the Court will address other issues presented.
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual.
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon
the 8% of value figure.

The undisputed facts show that the

State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its predecessors in
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based
upon 15C a ton.

If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were

going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did
not do.

By their conduct and failure to perform this duty,

they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the
acceptable royalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon,
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not
have done had they known that the defendants were going to
-7-

insist upon the 8% of value provision.

The great injustice

that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record
shows that to allow the imposition of the greater royalty, the
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity
under the State Lease.
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate.

No substantial

adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty
retroactively.

The State can still proceed to lease coal lands

on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State
the maximum return.

They still have the power to revise the

wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and
to carry out any legally established policy.
Further, the record shows that the plaintiffs would
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the
State's position and the contemplated change in the royalty
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result.
The Court further finds that the State had no right
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent
-8-

payments at the legal rate, or any penalty.

A legally binding

lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations
adopted subsequently.
The Lease does state that it is subject to such
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved
and adopted.

Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean

changes to or additions of monetary payment.

"Operating Rules"

has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical
interpretation.

Since the amount claimed by the State is not

subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be
due could not commence to run until demand is made.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants
plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for
and denies defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

February, 1988.

:D BUNNELL, T^Strict

Ju

ADDENDUM 2
JAMES M. ELEGANTE (A0 968)
PATRICIA J. WINMILL (A3523)
LUCY B. JENKINS (A2973)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-123 4
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARSON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation; and
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

Civil No. 14890

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

Plaintiffs'

motion

for

partial

summary

judgment

and

defendants1 motion for summary judgment came on for hearing at a
special session before the Court on Tuesday, February 16, 1988.
Plaintiffs were represented

by their counsel James M. Elegante

and Lucy B. Jenkins; defendants were represented by their counsel

Gayle F, McKeachnie and Clark B. Allred,
the arguments of counsel, having
exhibits

submitted

by

the

The Court, having heard

considered

parties,

and

the memoranda

having

previously

and
on

February 24, 1988, issued its Memorandum Decision on Motions for
Summary Judgment,
NOW, THEREFORE, HEREBY
1.

That plaintiffs

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:

owe no royalties, penalties, or

interest to defendants on Coal Lease No. 22729 as demanded

in

defendants' October 15, 1985 Royalty Audit Report,
2.

That

Complaint, relating

subparagraphs

(l) of plaintiffs1

36(h) and

to the determination of the value of coal,

are moot since the royalty rate of 8 percent is inapplicable and
these causes of action are dismissed without prejudice.
3.

That

each

party

shall

bear

its

attorneys1 fees in connection with this case.
DATED this

Z

' day of Marcn, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

-2-

own

costs

and

The above Judgment was prepared by James M. Elegante,
of and for Parsonsf Behle & Latimer, and was, prior to execution
by the Court and pursuant to Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in the
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, submitted to the following on this 2~?L

day of March, 1988:

David L. Wilkinson
Donald S. Coleman
Michael M. Quealy
David S. Christensen
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Gayle F. McKeachnie
Clark Br Allred
NIELSEN & SENIOR
363 East Main
Vernal, Utah 84078

i^2.

209:02298dA

r**r r*.ry*i

Ente^-d ?"*
-3-
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-•^•^r^

Proo< Re«d
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MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION

MIS'ERAL LEASE NO.
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ADDENDUM 3

Utah State Lease for

COAL
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE A N D AGREEMENT entered into in dupl.cate this
L ^ h day of
!*•£?]>.....by and between the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in behalf of the State of Utah, hereinafter called the Leaaor, and

19...15

MDUCTAXN STATES MACH1KEILY & SUPPLY INC.
P. 0. Box 7S1
Price, Utah

parry of the second part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Pursuant to Title c5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
WITNESSETH: That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be paid and the covenants to be observed by the Leasee, as hereinafter set forth, does hereby grant and lease to the Lessee the exclusive right and privilege to mine, remove, and dispose of aJ. of the
said minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in

\*2.Z ^Oi»

County, Sure of Utah, to-wit:

South Half (S*0 of Northwest Quarter (N* *;) • Souih a * : ' (2\) O- SocLJon Sixteor
( U ) , Tovmhip Fifteen (l r ») SouLh, Ranf.c El^.i- (o) L a c , S.iU L - ' c Meridian,

cor.t.vr.nv.: a total of
UU.v/U
acres, more or le.-s, tceether with th? rirht TO use and occupy so much cf the surface of «-.d la-.d a
mr.v be required for all purples reasonably incident to rhe min.ng. remova.. and disposal of said minerals, according t"> the prov;3..r.i o: this
lea>e. fo- the period endtne ten years after the firsr d..v of Januarv nex: succeeding the Ja:e hereof and as lone thereafter a; ss:d rr.ir.eraS n.j-.
be produced in commercul quantities from said land-, or Le^ee sh:.!! continue to make the payment? required bv Article HI hereof, upon
condition that ar t!-,e end of each twenty (20) year period succeeding the fir : day of :: • '.ear in which this le.:se is issued, such re-d.HJstrr.en*
of terms and condr.ons may be made as the Lessor mav determine to be necevsary .r. the .merest of the State.

ARTICLE i
This lea«-e is Granted subject m all respects ro and under the conditions of the lav.- of the Star? of L'tah and existing rules and reeulanor.s
and such operating rules and regulations as mav be hereafter approved and adop-ej r*v the State Land Board.

ARTICLE 11
This lea»e covers onlv the mining, removal, and disposal of the minerals spcc-fied in t'r./- lease, but the Lessee shall promptly rotify the
the Lessor of the discovery of any minerals excepting those enumerated herein.
ARTICLE III
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights and privileges aforesaid, herer-v covenants and agrees as follow*;
FIRST: To pay to the Lessor as rental for the land covered bv this lease the sum c! fifty (50) Lent* per acre per annum. All such annual
payments of rental shall be made in advance on the 2nd day of lanuarv of each \ear, except the
on the execution of this lease

.*:......T.

rental which is pavable

All renials shall be credited against royalties for the ve-r in which they accrue.

SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day o* the month jucceednv.; each quarter, royalty
[3) at the rati- of I V prr ton t.f 2000 ll>s of IM.II pioducrd fnou tfr>< l.as. d p u n i>»» .«nd sold or otherwise diiposed of. o'
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which payment is beir.- made, for federal lessees of land c'' similar character under coal lease* tssued by the United States at that time,
whichever is higher, and, commencing with the year beginning the January 1 following tvw years from the date hereof, to pjy annual royalty
of at least Si.J*J multiplied b> the number of acres hereh leased regirdless of actual production, provided that Lessor may, at Lrs time alter
the tenth anniversary date hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by not to exceed 50%.

If the coal produced from
product only, provided Leasee
ascertained and complies with
coal originating from the |eased

the leased premises is washed before sale or other disposition by Leasee, Leasee may pay royalty on the washed
maintains accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased premises can be
all regulations and directives issued by Lessor to prevent waste and to insure that royalty is paid on all washed
premises.

THIRD: To prepare and forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which
the material is produced, a certified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, and
•uch other additional information as the State Land Board may from time to time requite.
FOURTH: To keep ar die mine office clear, accurate and detailed maps on tracing cloth, en a scale not more than 50 feet to the inch,
of the workings in each section of the leased lands and on the lands adjacent, said maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land corner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and to furnish to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such
maps and such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shaii be made by i licensed engineer and all maps certified
to by him.
FIFTH: Not to fence or otherwise make inaccessibe to stock any watering place on the premises without first obtaining the written cement
of Lessor, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or subsurface water available or capable of being made available for domestic
or irrigation use.
SIXTH: Not to assign this lease or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premises, or any of the rights and privileges
herein granted, without the written consent of the Lessor being first hnd and obtained.

ARTICLE IV
The Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease:
FIRST: The right to permit for joint or several use such easements or rightvof-way upon, through, or in the land hereb\ leaded ns may
be necessary or appropriate to the working of these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits
or for other use.
SECOND: The right to use, lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of the surface of said lands or any part thereof, under existing Stare law?
or laws herenfrer enacted, insofar as said surface is nor necessary for the Lesee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the leaded substances therein, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those leased hereby, which may be contained in said lands- so long as the recovery of such deposits does not unreasonably interfere with Lessee's rights herein granted.

ARTICLE V
Upon failure or refusal of the Lessee to accept the readjustment of terms and conditions demanded bv the Lessor at the end of anv twentyyear period, such failure or refusal shall work a forfeiture of the lease and the same shall be canceled.

ARTICLE VI
In case of expiration, forfeiture. surrender or orher termination of this lease, all underground timbering supports, shaft hni-.rv ra !« and
other instalianons necessary for the support of underground workings of any mines, and all rails or head frames and a!! imrr.l.a'i^ns which
cannot be removed without permanent injurv to the premises and all construction and equipment installed underground to provide ven»ila!.?n
for anv.mtne>, upon or in the si id lands shall be and remain a part of the realry and shaii revert to the Lessor without further consideration or
compensation and shall be left by the Lessee in the lands.
All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said lands, and all buildmrs, machinery, equipment and tools (other than the
installations to become the propertv of Lessor as above provided), shall be and remain the property of Lessee and Lessee shall be enticed to,
and may, w.thin six (6) months after such expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of said lease, or within such extern•••n of
rime as may be granted by Lessor, remove from the said lands such personal property and improvements, other than those items wrvch ere
to remain the property of the Lessor as above provided.
Lessee shall, upon termination, of this lease or abandonment of the leased premise for anv reason, seal to Lessor's, satisfaction all or such
part of the mine openings on the premises as Lessor shall request be sealed.

ARTICLE VII
It shall be the responsibility of the Lessee to slope the sides of all operations of a surface nature to an angle of not less than 45* or to
erect a barrier around such operation as the State Land Board may require. Such sloping or fencing shall become a normal pan of the operation of the lease so as to keep pace w:th such operarion to the extent that such operation shall not constitute a hazard.
ARTICLE VIII
Lessee shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any water nghrs acquired for use upon die leased premises except mith Lessor's written permission. Upon termination of this lease for any reason, all such rights acquired by application to the Utah State Engineer shall revert to the
Lessor as an apponenance to the leased premises, and all such rights acquired by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchnse
at Lessee's acquisition costs, provided that Lessor shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if it does not accept the same within thirty
days after receipt thereof.

ARTICLE IX
All of the terms, covenants, conditions, and obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, ad" inistrators,
and assigns of the Leasee.

ARTICLE X
Leasee may terminate this lease at any time upon giving three (3) months* notice in writing to the Lessor and upon payment of all
rents and royalties and other sums due and payable to the Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this leaae with respect to the preservation of the workings in such order and condition as to permit of the continued operanon of the leased premises.

ARTICLE XI
Lessor, its officers and agents, shall have the right at all rimes to go in and upon the leased lands and premises, during the term of said
lease to inspect the work done and the progress thereof on said lands and the products obtained therefrom, and to post any notices on the
said land that it mav deem fit and proper; and also shall permit any authorized represenranves of the Lessor to examine all books ana records
pertaining to operations under this lease, and to make copies of and extracts from the same, if desired.
ARTICLF XII
This lease is issued only under such title as the State of Utah may now hold, and that in the event the State is hereafter divested of such
title, the Lessor shall not be liable for any damages sustained bv the Lessee, nor shall the Lessee be entited to or claim any refund of rentals
or royalties or other monies theretofcre paid to the Lessor.
ARTICLE Xlll
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On the

day of

LESSEE'* INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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, personal

the signer of the above instrument, who dulv acknowledged to me
Given under my hand and seal this

LESSEE

appeared before me
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executed the same.

day of
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My commission Expires:
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N°"ry Public, residing a:-.

1-

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the l i t t h . . . day of

April

LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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appeared before me
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who bemq: duly sworn did say that he is an officer of M t Z L . „ S . t a t 5 A . . ^ S L C i i y . . . A : - . S u p . p i j . „ I a C . .
in behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Director** «*d said

and that said insrrurr.er.t was signed

.W.ajnft..$.».Jfa&$T

—

._

acL'?*!-

edged to me that said corporation executed the same.

Given under my hand and s?ai this ....l.^.'fcii

day of

....ApXi—...
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My commission Expires-

April

23»

Notary Public, residing a::
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

}-

On tke
dav of
... \
*
.19
, per*° n a U v appeared before nie Max C. Gardner, who bring hv m«* dulv sworn
did say that he is the Director of thr Statr Land Board of thr S t a t r oi L t a h *"d that said instrument waa signed in behalf of said Board by
resolution oi the Board, and said Max C. Gardner acknowledged «« mr that said Beard executed the same in behalf of thr Statr of Utah.
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I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the

foregoing

Brief of Appellants to James M. Elegante,

PARSON, BEHLE & LATIMER, 185 South States Street, Suite 700, P.O.
Box 11898, Salt Lake City, Utah

84147-0898. on this A^day of

June, 1988.
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